

clined to advertise publicly or used ads showing only whites some "signal that minority families were unwelcome."

The commission's criticism of the 235 program was a followup salvo to a barrage aimed at the program last year and earlier this year by the House Banking and Currency Committee. The committee charged that the poor were being swindled by unscrupulous speculators who unloaded rundown and frequently unsafe houses on them at inflated prices.

#### PLEOGE MAOE

HUD Secretary George Romney pledged to clean up the 235 program, and at one time early in 1970 suspended purchases of existing homes with FHA mortgage subsidies until appraisal and inspection practices could be perfected to protect the low income buyers. Later, Romney announced a series of new rules were being put into effect to safeguard the poor against real estate speculators trying to get rid of deteriorated houses at prices higher than they were worth.

Under the 235 program, the FHA not only insures long-term mortgages for poor families seeking their own homes, but pays part of the interest charges to keep the payments low.

#### LAOS: SECRET SHAME

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, anyone who believes in the Christian Ethic can only read with sadness and shame an article entitled "Laos" written by H. D. S. Greenway, and published in the July Atlantic Monthly.

I would hope that every Senator would read the article. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### LAOS

(By H. D. S. Greenway)

The springtime in Laos is very dry. Save for the brief Mango rains, the heat is unrelieved, and shriveled green leaves lie like dead frogs in the dusty roads. The sun is dull red in the smoke and haze, for in the springtime the hill people slash and burn the brush off the hillsides. The pilots say that the haze stretches all across the northern marches of Southeast Asia from North Vietnam across to Burma. The Air America helicopters must pick their way carefully among the fantastic limestone outcroppings that rise like castles from the wooded hills tumbling out of China. One realizes that the misty mountains of the classical Chinese landscape paintings were not the product of artistic imaginations, but faithful reproductions of nature.

Here in these hills, fifty miles northeast of Vientiane, there is an airstrip known to the pilots as site 272. It is the center for American refugee relief in Northern Laos and the fall-back point for Long Cheng, the secret CIA base twenty-five miles to the north. Long Cheng is the headquarters for the Meo General Vang Pao's "Armée Clandestine," supported by the CIA. All this past winter and spring the base has been under siege by the North Vietnamese. The hill peoples, the highland Lao and the Meo dependents of Vang Pao's army, have been fleeing south by the thousands, pouring into the hills and valleys near site 272. They make temporary bamboo shelters, and Air America drops rice to them, for they have no food. There is the despair of uncertainty. No one can tell them what their future will be. Like Laos itself, they have long since lost control of their own destiny.

In one such makeshift settlement the village chief greets visitors with a gold-toothed smile. There are over nine hundred people in his immediate area—four hundred

of them are children. One night, the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese had come to his village. The soldiers in a nearby government outpost had detected no enemies in the area: "So we went to be happy," the village chief said.

"But at four o'clock in the morning we were attacked. Before we knew it, they were in this village shooting and the houses were burning." Squatting down on his haunches, the village chief described with his hands in the dirt how the enemy had come and the attack on the outpost—the short, sharp explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the measured hammering of the fifty-calibers, and then silence. Death had come in the classic Indochina way: a small, isolated outpost overrun in the night. It was a scene that has been played a thousand times in the last twenty-five years of war.

The villagers escaped into the surrounding woods, and for two days they marched over some of the most impenetrable and inhospitable country on earth. "We were so sorry to leave everything behind," the chief said, "and the march was very difficult. We walked two days, and the people cried and cried over the mountains. Two people died; one was an old person and the other was a child." There was talk that the men might be conscripted into Vang Pao's army, but the chief did not know for sure, and he did not know what would happen to his people. "I am afraid," he said.

#### "FOR WHAT?"

At site 272 the Air America planes continue taking off and landing in a roar of red dust, bringing rice, pigs, and ducks to the refugees. But one senses the end of a decade of American policy in Laos. Ten years ago, when the Americans first began to train and equip the Meo tribesmen, Vang Pao's guerrillas operated all over Northeastern Laos—far behind enemy lines to the borders of North Vietnam itself. Fewer than two dozen American servicemen have been killed in these mountains. Asians fight Asians. But ten years of costly, vainglorious offensives and unremitting pressure from North Vietnamese counteroffensives have pushed the Meo beyond their endurance. Vang Pao's losses in the last three years have been so heavy that the Armée Clandestine is no longer an exclusively Meo force. Almost half their numbers are now made up of other highland peoples. And in the last three or four years, the Meo have been organized to fight in battalion-sized units of over five hundred men instead of small guerrilla units. As a result, the slaughter has been magnified. Vang Pao's army can no longer hold Long Cheng alone, and by early April it was reliably reported by Lao and American sources that no fewer than five thousand Thai troops had been flown in to bolster the Long Cheng front. (The Thai government still denies the presence of Thai troops in Laos, but their presence is common knowledge in Vientiane.)

For ten years the Meo people have been running and dying, and today there are few mountain ranges left into which to escape. American officials estimate that fully 15 percent of the 250,000 to 300,000 people in the military region that makes up Northeast Laos have died within the last three years.

The official Laotian and American Embassy position is that the Long Cheng airstrip must be held at all costs, but there is a general realization that the game is almost played out as far as the Meo are concerned. Officials speak of an eventual accommodation with the Communists, and say that the Armée Clandestine is all but finished as an effective fighting force.

Many of the Americans who have worked with the Meo have become profoundly disillusioned. The senior USAID official in the Northeast, Edgar Buell, the former Indiana farmer known as "Pop," who in ten years

has become a Lawrence of Arabia figure to the Meo, is himself a casualty. Recovering now from a serious heart attack, burdened by overwork and worry during the last few years of disasters, Buell said: "All of this is difficult for us who have worked with these people since the beginning. Some of my boys are beginning to wonder, what was it all for?"

Some Americans are beginning to wonder why, if there is to be an accommodation now, we didn't encourage one ten years ago. Perhaps the arming and supplying of guerrillas so close to the North Vietnamese border provoked greater North Vietnamese retaliation in an area that has nothing to do with the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the war in Vietnam. Although it is true that the Meo had asked for arms in the first place, some Americans argue that they were urged to fight on for U.S. interests beyond their capacity and beyond anything that could be considered in their own interest.

"You know, over two thirds of the 170,000 people we are supporting in the Northeast are refugees," said one American with many years' experience. "Few have been permanently located, and they are milling about in limbo. Anthropologists call the Meo a seminomadic people, but before the war they would move only when they ran out of land. Normally, they might move only ten kilometers or so, and they might take a year to make the move. But to be uprooted as they are now is a great trauma for them."

"In these large refugee moves over the last four or five years we have found that about 10 or 15 percent die during the move or just afterwards," the American said. One always knew that the long marches were killers. When whole populations were on the move, walking for days on end through the mountains, one knew that the old, the weak, and the very young died. But, said the American, experience showed that about the same number of people died anyway even if they had been carried out by plane or helicopter. "We have American doctors waiting for them with mosquito nets, malaria pills, penicillin, the works. But they die anyway. It is the move itself—the adjusting to a new area, different food and water. Of course, part of the problem is that, like all Southeast Asians, a lot of these people are sick and weak to begin with. But a lot of it is psychosomatic—bad *phi* [spirits]. Just the trauma of moving kills them. They think they are going to die, and they do."

Edgar Buell expressed the phenomenon a little differently. "Just moving; causes a kind of sickness," he said. "I wouldn't go so far as to say they die of a broken heart or anything like that, but, yes—you can just about say that for a lot of people, moving means dying."

#### "UP IN THE SKY"

In the summer of 1969, in what may prove to have been Vang Pao's last successful offensive, the Armée Clandestine, with American logistical and air support, captured the Plain of Jars from the overextended North Vietnamese. But some people thought that the brilliantly executed offensive was a foolish escalation of the conflict. By February of 1970, Vang Pao had been pushed back off the plain, with heavy losses.

The raid produced one of the biggest refugee movements of the Laotian war. Fifteen thousand inhabitants from the Plain of Jars were resettled in camps near Vientiane. The last airplane load left on the tenth of February, 1970. A silver C-130 with the American markings painted over landed in a rooster tail of dust on a makeshift strip on the western edge of the Plain of Jars. The last terrified refugees—it was their first plane ride—were herded aboard against the hurricane blast of the prop wash; nothing was left behind except their dogs, forming in packs and snarling among the refuse of their encampment.

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"Some of them have slipped back to the Pathet Lao," said an American official at the time, "but we have rounded up most of the population, and the name of the game is control of the population."

The refugees were set up in temporary bamboo barracks. Now, a year later, these refugees have not yet been permanently resettled. Their conditions are good by refugee standards in Indochina, but the mental fatigue of their impermanent and unsettled status has begun to engulf them. They long for the cool uplands where they were born. To Americans who question them, they speak of their lives behind the Communist lines before they came away from the Plain of Jars. And they describe the role of American and American-supplied air power.

And old grandfather sits lethargically in the shade with his son-in-law and talks about his former life. "Our old house was big and made of wood, not bamboo," he said. "But there is just dust there now. All was burned. We had big, wide rice fields and many buffaloes. There were few trees and the rice grew really high—before the planes came."

In 1967 the grandfather saw only a few planes in the sky, but in 1968 and 1969: "Wow! Maybe we would see two hundred planes in a day," he said, and he drew childish but recognizable pictures of the Laotian T-28's and the American jets he had seen. In August, 1968, his fourteen-year-old nephew was killed.

"The child was out tending the buffaloes when the planes came. He ran for a hole to hide, but he did not run fast enough, for the bombs killed him. They killed three buffaloes at the same time. The bombs cut his head off and his arm, and his insides came out on the ground. Many pieces of him went up in the sky," the grandfather said.

His niece, a woman of thirty, was also killed. "She was afraid to go out of the house because the planes shot at anything that moved," he said. "But the bombs fell on the house, and she was killed."

Later, in 1969, when many of the houses in the village had been destroyed, the people left their houses and lived in holes in the ground. "Every family had a hole, and we would live in the holes—even cook in the holes. We tried to plant our rice at night, but even at night the planes would come. They would drop flares and make it really bright—like day. They were trying to shoot the Pathet Lao soldiers, I suppose, but there weren't any soldiers on the plain. They all lived in the woods in the mountains," the grandfather said.

Periodically the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese cadres would come. "They would teach us things and talk about politics. The children studied and studied, and they would learn to read. The adults who could not read were taught, too, and whoever had the knowledge could go teach someone else. Sometimes women even taught men," the grandfather said. When they were hungry and could not grow their own rice, the Communists would give them rice and fish from Vietnam," the grandfather said. "But they didn't just take things like the government soldiers, who just took our animals. Sometimes they [the North Vietnamese] would trade us salt and ducks for dogs because they ate dogs. Ten or twelve kilos of salt was the price of a dog."

From time to time, the villagers would be asked to serve as porters for the Pathet Lao, which they didn't like. "Sometimes," said the son-in-law, "we had to carry ammunitions and guns. If there were twenty of us, ten might carry the guns and rockets and ten would carry rice. Sometimes we would have to go for several days, but if you were old you did not have to go. In the daytime we would sleep in the forest and move only at night."

The villagers said that the North Viet-

namese never asked them to serve as porters because they brought their own porters, mostly women, from Vietnam.

In the summer of 1969, Vang Pao's Armée Clandestine came. "We were hiding when they came," the grandfather said. "There were about two hundred of them. They said: 'Whoever is there, come out. Come out! You cannot stay here. If you stay here, it means you want to go with the Pathet Lao, and we will shoot you.'" And so the villagers were taken away, and the soldiers burned the houses that were left standing. Were they taken by force? "Oh, we were glad enough to go from there because of the bombing," the grandfather said, "but you were not able not to go."

An old woman, also a refugee from the Plain of Jars, sat with her small granddaughter. Her son, the child's father, had died from disease, and another son had been killed by the "bombs"—the word Laotians use for the antipersonnel bombs that spray flesh-destroying pellets when they explode. "He was out transplanting rice at night," she said, "when the planes came. They took him to a hospital in a cave, but he died."

#### "THE ENEMIES"

"All the houses in our village were destroyed by bombs," the old lady said, "and all we had left was our own bodies. There were ten houses in our village and the *wat* [temple], and the *wat* was destroyed, too. We were always afraid of the planes, and we lived in deep holes as high as a man's head. Maybe fifteen planes would come each day, and we made a place for ourselves in the holes, and we cooked and slept in the holes. The children were very afraid when the planes came, and they cried and cried. The mosquitoes were very bad, and when the rain came, the water would come up to our knees and it was difficult to sleep."

Sometimes the Pathet Lao would ask for porters from her village, too. "My sons and daughters had to go, and I didn't like it. I did not go myself because I am too old. I am sixty-three. Sometimes when the enemies would come near we were really afraid, and there was lots of firing when they came near. Old people do not understand the war," said the old woman.

Many villagers spoke of "the enemies," as indeed they do in Cambodia as well. They do not mean their own enemies. Just the enemies—people who are fighting each other.

The American Embassy, when asked why the Plain of Jars Villages were bombed, says that the rules of engagement in the air war are very strict. The rules are that population centers cannot be bombed, and that villages are hit only by accident—the accidents of war. But in dozens of interviews I had in 1970 and 1971 with people from different towns around the Plain of Jars, the evidence led to the conclusion that the population centers behind the Pathet Lao lines had frequently been bombed by U.S. and Laotian aircraft.

#### "ALL WE REALLY HAVE"

There are still backwater villages in Laos where it is possible to believe that there is no war, and such a village is Ban Xa Phong Meuk. It is only twelve kilometers from Vientiane, and the wooden thatched-roof houses are built on stilts in the traditional Laotian way. In the heat of the day, chickens, ducks, and sway-backed cows sleep underneath the houses in the shade.

Po Tou Douang was born in the village around the turn of the century, and he has never been further than a few kilometers away. The wooden floor of his open-sided house has a high polish, the result of decades of bare feet upon it. His body is old out tough and sinewy. His eyesight is going, but his hands are still quick and sure at the old skills of weaving rice baskets out of straw or making fish traps or copying Buddhist scriptures onto strips of bamboo leaf. The

invasions that have swept across Laos in his lifetime have scarcely touched him. He remembers hearing the guns firing along the Mekong after the fall of France in 1940, when the Thais attacked the isolated French garrisons. Later he heard firing again, and his little son ran to tell him that the Japanese had come to Vientiane. "The French ran away to the North," he said, but he never saw a Japanese in his village.

To Po Tou Douang the Americans are much the same as the French and other foreigners otherworldly and unapproachable beings. Like the *phi*, the magic spirits that haunt all Laotian life, the unpredictable beings must be placated and charmed lest they prove dangerous.

In 1969, the Pathet Lao managed to blow up a government ammunition dump about five miles away, and in the false dawn the explosions lit up the sky and the ground shook beneath the village. The people crowded into the trenches they had dug and waited in fear while the ammunition burned and boomed on into the night. The old man remembers the courage of his neighbor who left his trench during the explosions to bring cakes to the village spirit house, in case the village should need supernatural protection.

Save for those few brushes with war, Ban Xa Phong Meuk continues as it has for centuries. The demarcations of the past, present, and future are blurred and softened in the traditional village, and the incidents of war have been like acts of nature which interrupt and punctuate the rhythm of the rice-growing.

Po Tou Douang can read only the Buddhist scriptures, which he has learned by rote from the monks. He has no education and no money. But does the townsman have a better life? "Oh, for sure not," he said. "Take me. During the dry season I fetch water and cut firewood. At the end of the dry season I used to look up in the sky. Ho! Time to plant my upland rice and vegetables, so I got out there in my paddies to plow, and I would stand behind my buffalo, push him along saying, 'Tsk, tsk, hey you! Go straight.' I worked as I liked. If I felt tired or the sun was too hot, I'd stop that day, come back to the house, and rest. The next day I would go back, and soon the plowing and planting and transplanting were finished. Nothing to do for a few months—fetch water, cut wood, fish. Then go harvest the rice, and I was all set for the next season."

The old man's eldest son, Khamphouang, is a townsman. Now in his forties, he has none of the old skills. He cannot weave baskets or make fish traps, nor can he write Buddhist scriptures on bamboo leaves. But he can speak French and English, and he has been to Europe and America.

Khamphouang is an orthopedic technician—a maker of artificial legs. Business is good, for legless men have become something of a cash crop in Laos. He works in the yellow stucco orthopedic hospital in Vientiane—a sad, dusty place on the edge of town.

Sitting in the cool of Khamphouang's office, watching the amputees shuffling about on crutches in the remorseless heat in the courtyard, we spoke of the war in Laos. We spoke of the Air America planes flying into dangerous dirt airstrips bringing rice for refugees. We spoke of the Americans who worked twelve or fifteen hours a day trying to help the homeless and dispossessed and of the bombers, which, with equal vigor and dedication, were bombing people out of their homes. We spoke of the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, who were against corruption and seldom stole from the people, and yet who, year after year, continued to kill and maim the men whom Khamphouang tried to put back together.

"We have nothing in Laos," he said. "We have neither money nor factories to make arms. But we have other people from other

countries to help us, so all we really have is unending war. If peace does not come soon, I am afraid we are all going to die."

#### DEAN RUSK'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, with the recent publication of the Pentagon papers many individuals and public officials have rushed to join in condemnation of four administrations—particularly the Johnson administration—over our involvement in Vietnam. As a result, a number of myths have evolved and these individuals have taken it upon themselves to perpetuate these myths before all the facts have come to light.

However, the whole picture of our involvement in Vietnam is coming into focus. In Sunday's Washington Star, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk provides very lucid answers to the distortions which have arisen as the result of the publication of this 47-volume study.

I, therefore, ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the interview was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### DEAN RUSK LOOKS BACK ON VIETNAM

Here is a partial text of an interview with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk by Star Staff reporters Crosby S. Noyes and George Sherman:

Q. In discussing the Pentagon papers, you have said recently that you thought the presentation was basically fair in some respects. The criticism has been made that there are major distortions in these papers of the performance and the motivations of the administration in making decisions about the war in Vietnam. Would you comment on how you feel about it?

A. Well, I think the papers that I have seen do bring out the fact that there was very lively discussion within the government during this period about Vietnamese problems. But I do not believe that the net impressions of the papers are accurate as to what was in the minds of the President and his Cabinet colleagues at crucial moments of decision.

Q. Do you think that the effect of these papers is helpful so far as the government as a whole is concerned, or do you think it tends to discredit government in the public mind?

A. Since I have no knowledge as to what is in the 40-volume report, I have no way of making an independent judgment that the report itself was fair and representative, with respect to the tons and tons of materials that are in the State Department, the White House files, and even in the Pentagon on this subject. Since I have not seen the 40-volume report, I have no way of judging whether the press reports that have been published are fair and impartial reflections of the report itself.

I am concerned about the use of anonymous analysts who put thoughts in our minds and sometimes words in our mouths which we had no opportunity to consider and comment about. At no time did those who wrote these reports ask us directly what we had in mind at particular periods. And at no time have any of the press who have been reporting on the contents of the report call me up on the telephone and ask me whether the impressions of a particular analyst were a fair reflection of what I had in mind at that time. So I think that what has happened thus far has been a fragment of an enormous amount of material, the quality and validity of which is not now subject to public inspection and examination and judgment.

Q. Mr. Rusk, you said that what's been published so far didn't represent what was going on in the mind of the President or his Cabinet officers. Could you give us several examples?

A. Well, for example, there was some discussion about the possibility of our taking certain steps to provoke the North Vietnamese to take certain actions which in turn would be used by us as a basis for further action on our part.

Now the President and his Cabinet officers never approved or gave any serious attention to such acts of provocation, because we were not interested in building up the war further, we wanted to scale it down. And it would not have been in our interest nor was it our judgment to provoke the other side into doing things as a basis for further actions on our part.

Q. Do you mean you wanted to scale it down at every stage?

A. At every stage, I think one must bear in mind there would not have been a single American soldier in Southeast Asia shooting a weapon at anybody if Ho Chi Minh had kept his guerrillas and his regiments and his divisions in his own country. That's the most elementary point involved.

I do not get from what I've seen thus far about these reports that much attention has been paid to what the North Vietnamese were doing all of this time. And this is crucial to understand the events of '64 and '65 because it was not until the end of '64 and the beginning of '65 that the North Vietnamese began to move the regiments and divisions of their regular army in what appeared to be an all-out invasion of South Vietnam.

Q. You think there isn't enough historical content in the presentation?

A. That's right, I regret that they even applied the name history to it because I do not have the impression that the disciplines of history were used in the preparation of this report. Had this been taken up as an administration matter in which the Defense Department, the State Department and the White House would try to build up the story of this affair, I'm sure that we would have turned it over to the professional historians in our respective departments who are not subject to day by day and week by week guidance as to what materials they use.

For example, the series called The Foreign Relations of the United States, meets high standards of historical accuracy and I find that aspect missing. I have no way of judging the individual analysts because they're still anonymous. And we don't know what their historical training is, we don't know what their motivations might have been, and what purposes they might have had in mind. So it seems to me there is still much too much secrecy about something which is being acclaimed as a great revelation. What I'd like to see—if this much of the story comes out—I'd like to see more of it come out.

Q. The critics of the war are saying that these papers show that the United States and its government in this period was aggressive, militaristic, deceitful and insensitive to moral and human values involved in the problem of the war in Vietnam. Is that an accurate picture, do you think?

A. I think a good deal of this is nonsense. In the first place, by no stretch of the imagination can one absolve North Vietnam from the perpetration of acts of aggression against Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia.

International law is not corrupt, it is not frivolous. Look at the important declaration of friendly relations proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in its last session which interpreted the illegal use of force referred to in article 24 of the U.N. Charter. It was very specific that every state has an obligation to refrain from the threats or use of force in violating demarcation lines and armistice lines. It was also very specific

that they have an obligation to refrain from organizing irregular forces and guerrillas and mercenaries and groups of that sort to penetrate across national boundaries into other countries.

Now as far as deceit is concerned, I want to emphasize that there is a big difference between the wide range of contingency planning and thinking that might go on at staff levels and what might be in the mind of the President and his cabinet advisers as far as policy is concerned. The simple fact is that President Johnson did not bomb North Vietnam until February 1965, when he did approve a small retaliatory raid for the attack on Pleiku, and did not enter into any systematic bombing of North Vietnam until March and April.

Q. You were saying that there was no decision on the bombing until it was clear that there was a large scale North Vietnamese invasion of the South. Would you be more specific on that question because the suggestion in the papers is that there had been a consensus on the bombing before the 1964 election which wasn't carried out until February 1965?

A. There was no consensus on bombing North Vietnam at any time in 1964 that included me, and more particularly, a consensus that included President Johnson.

I think if anyone were to look at the totality of what President Johnson said during the campaign of 1964 rather than just pick up a phrase or two, they would find out that President Johnson made it very clear that we would meet our commitments in South Vietnam, that we believed that an aggression was in prospect, that the course of world peace depended upon our helping to resist that aggression.

He also said that we did not want a wider war, and that was true. We did not want a war as wide as the one we already had. But it was not until very late spring and very early summer of 1965 that President Johnson began to increase the American forces in South Vietnam significantly beyond the totals that had been approved by President Kennedy. Now the reason for that was that President Johnson was faced with a new situation which President Kennedy never had to face; namely, the formal invasion of South Vietnam by the organized units of the North Vietnamese forces.

Q. That didn't come until after the election?

A. It did not come until well after the election. The very beginnings of it came at the end of 1964 and then it began to build up in early 1965.

Q. Do you mean the bombing which began in February '65 was in fact a response?

A. No, I think the bombing in February was a specific low scale retaliatory action. The bombing began in March and built up in April and later. It was inaugurated in the light of the obvious indications that a major invasion of South Vietnam was underway.

Q. This was not clear in any way before the election?

A. We always knew that such a thing was possible. And so if the staff was going to be worthy of their salt, it was up to them to think about all these contingencies and to talk about the various contingencies that we might be faced with. But that's a far different thing from saying that President Johnson had decided in 1964 to bomb the North or to make a major addition to U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

Q. Do you think a larger effort would have been justified?

A. I think the historian would want to study very carefully the gradualism of our responses to North Vietnamese escalation. It is possible that had we looked at it very soberly in 1961 and realized that there was no agreement between ourselves and the Russians on Vietnam—although there appeared to be one on Laos—that the thing to do in

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Symington unsigned from Secretary of Defense  
in support of Laos operation

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For

*Ed*

7-9-71

*We will let you know  
when this is signed.*

*Loz*

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**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301**

Honorable Stuart E. Symington  
United States Senate

Dear Senator Symington:

This is in response to your letter of May 27, 1971, concerning Department of Defense expenditures in support of our operations in Laos.

In cases where amounts reported transferred to other agencies differ from the related expenses shown by those agencies in reports given separately to you, the difference is attributable to differing definitions and reprogramming in amounts small enough not to require interagency coordination.

Attached is your list of questions with our answers.

Sincerely,

Enclosures - 16

cc: ATSD(LA)  
General Counsel  
ASD(ISA)

**TOP SECRET**

**SENSITIVE**

WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS



SECRET

1. Question: What is the total cost of military assistance to Laos expected to be in FY 1971? What is the projected cost for FY 1972?

Answer: The estimated cost of military assistance to Laos included in the President's FY 1972 budget was \$117.3 million and \$125.8 million. Our latest comparable estimates for these amounts are \$148 million and \$138.5 million in FY 1971/72.

As you know, there is a so called "program" for Laos that exceeds the amounts included in the budget. The current fiscal year 1972 program for Laos totals \$221.2 million. The program is a management tool utilized by OSD and intermediate commanders to establish a constraint on the total resources to be provided to a country as contrasted to the amounts included in a specific year's appropriation request to the Congress. The program figure will exceed the budget figure for each fiscal year because the program level can be partly supported by stocks that will not require replacement, including excess or long supply stocks.

If such stocks are used, they count against the program but not against the budget because they were bought in prior years for U.S. force requirements and are no longer needed for that purpose.

The program, in other words, gives OSD a more precise control because (1) through the program we can examine and approve the item content of our assistance and (2) it establishes a total resource constraint. The budget amounts are the funds needed in the stated fiscal year to procure equipment specifically for the Lao Government and for operation and maintenance support for local forces in Laos.

SECRET



2. Question: What is the cost of maintaining the organization headed by the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPJUSMAGTHAI) which supports military assistance activities in Laos?

Answer: (UNCLASSIFIED) The estimated annual operating cost to maintain the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (which is funded in the appropriation, O&M, Navy) is as follows:

	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	FY 1970	FY 1971	FY 1972
O&M, Navy	1,566	1,512	1,530

This amount includes funds for Project 404, an in-country augmentation of the attache office budgeted within the DEPCJUSMAGTHAI Organization.

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3. Question: What are the comprehensive costs, direct and indirect, including personnel, facilities, aircraft and ordnance, of U.S. air activities, for all services, in and over Laos for FY 1971 and FY 1972? What are the average per sortie costs for the operation of various types of U.S. aircraft in Laos?

Answer: The following table gives estimated tactical sortie costs for aircraft used over Laos.

<u>Air Force</u>		<u>Marines</u>		<u>Navy</u>	
<u>Type</u>	<u>\$/Sortie</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>\$/Sortie</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>\$/Sortie</u>
A-1	\$6,100	A-4	\$7,700	A-4	\$7,700
AC-119	21,100	A-6	7,700	A-6	7,700
AC-130	25,300	F-4	9,000	A-7	7,700
F-100	4,600			F-4	9,000
F-105	9,000			F-8	7,700
F-4	9,000				
B-57	22,500				
B-52	31,000				

The ordnance carried by these aircraft represents about 80 percent of the sortie cost the remainder is the cost of personnel, operations, and maintenance. These tactical sorties represent approximately 60 percent of the 150,000 sorties flown over Laos in the first ten months of FY 1971. The remaining 40 percent of the sorties are largely USAF supporting aircraft, the costs of which are more accurately reflected by yearly operations and maintenance, rather than sortie, costs. In the table below are given the numbers and per year costs of squadrons which can be considered supporting the Laos effort.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Numbers of Squadrons</u>	<u>Total Cost per Squadron (\$ Million)</u>
EC-121	1	26.0
UC-123/C-123	1	9.0
RF-4	1	19.3
O-2/OV-10	1	10.7
HH-53	1	6.8
HC-130	1	7.0

The above costs for the supporting aircraft are total, not incremental, costs and will be only slightly reduced when the units are returned to CONUS, since normal operational and training flights will continue at about the same annual rate.

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3. Answer: (continued)

An estimate of the comprehensive costs for U.S. air activities over Laos includes installation costs, tactical sortie costs, and costs for the supporting squadrons. During FY 71 the Air Force maintained five bases in Thailand which can be considered supporting the Laos air effort. Total costs for these five bases is approximately \$100 million in FY 71. Based on numbers and types of supporting aircraft, their costs for sorties over Laos are \$78.8 million in FY 71.

Costs for the tactical sorties, by Service, during the first 10 months of FY 71 are shown below:

<u>Service</u>	<u>(\$ Millions)</u> <u>Costs</u>
Air Force	749.6
Navy	189.3
Marine Corps	<u>29.8</u>
Total	968.7

Costs for FY 72 will depend on the sortie rates which will be established and the U.S. redeployment and phasedown in Southeast Asia, and cannot be determined at this time.

4. Question: What is the cumulative cost of the facilities and equipment now operated by Task Force Alpha? What are the personnel and operating costs of Task Force Alpha? For FY 1971? What is estimated for FY 1972?

Answer: (UNCLASSIFIED) Through FY 1971, the cumulative military construction program cost of the facilities at Task Force Alpha is \$3.7 million and the cumulative investment cost of the equipment is \$13.5 million. The FY 1971 personnel and operating cost of Task Force Alpha is approximately \$3.3 million and \$4.5 million respectively. It is estimated that the FY 1972 personnel cost will be \$2.5 million and the other operating cost will be \$2.9 million.

- 5a. Question: What is the current fiscal year cost of maintaining the U.S. Army and Air Force Attache organizations in Laos, including pay, allowance, housing, local personnel costs, supplies, equipment, transportation, communications and office space? What is the estimate of FY 1972 costs?

Answer: The current fiscal year cost and the estimate of FY 1972 costs of maintaining the U.S. Army and Air Force Attache organizations in Laos is \$779,500 for FY 1971 and \$765,800 for FY 1972. The following provides the details of these costs:

	(\$ in Thousands)	
	Actual FY 1971	Estimate FY 1972
Military Pay and Allowance	267.9	289.0
Confidential Military Emergency and Extraordinary Fund Expense	55.9	26.1
Leased Family Housing	98.4	103.3
Local Civilian Personnel	2.9	3.1
Temporary Duty Travel	12.7	13.0
Transportation	-	-
Communications	.1	.1
Equipment Maintenance	7.0	8.0
Other Purchased Services	8.1	7.7
Assigned Aircraft, Flying Hour Cost	114.0	106.0
Aircraft petroleum, oil and lubricants	20.7	20.7
Supplies	3.1	3.6
Equipment	-	1.1
Miscellaneous	8.0	8.0
Reimbursable Expenses Paid to U.S. Department of State for Administrative Support by the Defense Intelligence Agency	167.7	176.1
Procurement Costs of 4 Sedans and 1 Station Wagon	13.0	-
Total	779.5	765.8

5b. Question: How much is included in the U.S. Army and Air Force Attache organizations in Laos associated with the American Forward Air Controllers in Laos?

Answer: There are no funds included in the U.S. Army and Air Force Attache organization in Laos for support of the American Forward Air Controllers in Laos. Funds for their support are included in DEPJUSMAGTHAI. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Supplies.

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6. Question: What Defense Department related or financed activities are now being conducted or are contemplated in Laos through or under the auspices of the AID program? What is the cost of these activities for FY 1971 and what will it be for FY 1972?

Answer: (CONFIDENTIAL)

	<u>DoD Financed</u>	
	(\$ Millions)	
	<u>FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1972</u>
Requirements Office	2.0	2.0
Subsistence Consumables and Associated Air Transport Costs	8.4	8.4

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10. Question: What is the value of surplus or excess equipment given to the Royal Lao Armed Forces or to U. S. financed irregular forces, both Lao and Thai, for use in Laos?

Answer: (CONFIDENTIAL) The total value (at acquisition cost) of long supply and excess Department of Defense equipment turned over to the Royal Lao Government is \$26,171,000 through May 1971.

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11. Question: What is the total value of U.S. financed military equipment and supplies given, transferred, or loaned to the Royal Lao Armed Forces by third countries, including specifically Thailand?

Answer: (SECRET) No U.S. financed military equipment and supplies have been given, transferred, or loaned to the RLCAF by third countries, including Thailand, to our knowledge. The question may allude to ten T-28D aircraft formerly in the Royal Thai Air Force out now in use in the RLAF pilot training program conducted by the United States in Thailand. These aircraft were not transferred by the Thai to the Lao but rather by the Thai to the U. S.

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12. Question: What was the cost of all types of military or military related training, including travel costs and language training, provided by the United States to Laos in FY 1971? What are the projected costs for FY 1972?

Answer:

	(\$ Millions)	
	<u>FY 1971</u>	<u>FY 1972</u>
Army	2.2	1.9
Air Force	.4	.4

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13. Question: Describe the types and value of U.S. military aircraft loaned, rented or "bailed" to Air America, Continental Airlines, Lao Air Transport, Royal Air Lao or any other company during FY 1971. What is the total amount of payments or other forms or reimbursement received for the use of these aircraft?

Answer: (SECRET)

- a. The following USAF transport aircraft are "bailed" to Air America to support operations in Laos.
  1. One C-130 on temporary "as required" bailment. Normally only one is in operation by Air America at a given time. The cumulative average flyaway cost of the C-130E based on procurement of 387 aircraft through FY 1972 is \$2.1 million. Current flyaway replacement cost of a C-130 is \$3.4 million.
  2. Twelve C-123K aircraft on permanent bailment. The cumulative average flyaway cost of twelve aircraft is \$6.36 million.
  3. Seven C-7A aircraft on permanent bailment. The cumulative average flyaway cost of seven aircraft is \$5.6 million.
- b. USAF pays operating and maintenance costs on the above aircraft and receives reimbursement at standard flying hour rates in return. Total reimbursement received for the above aircraft during calendar year 1970 from other U.S. government agencies was \$6,331,290.07. (Exception: DoD pays for that portion of the C-130 flying time in support of USAID requirements for delivery of rice to remote areas; the total for calendar 1970 was \$321,328.00).
- c. USAF is also reimbursed by other U.S. government agencies for USAF CH-3 and H-53 flying hours flown in support of certain operations in Laos; total during calendar year 1970 was \$662,842.20.

It is anticipated that FY 1971 and FY 1972 requirements will be approximately the same as fiscal year 1970.

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14. Question: What was the cost of all construction financed by Defense appropriated funds in Laos in fiscal years 1970 and 1971? What construction is contemplated in FY 1972?

Answer: (UNCLASSIFIED) Prior year Defense appropriated funds were used to finance construction in Laos in FY 1970 and 1971 in the amounts of \$2,367,000 and \$3,809,000 respectively.

There is no construction for Laos in the FY 1972 Military Construction Program to be financed by Defense appropriated funds.





16. Question: In addition to the information requested above, are there any other categories of Defense Department expenditures in Laos? What amounts are expected to be spent for these activities in FY 1971 and FY 1972?

Answer: (UNCLASSIFIED) There are no other categories of DoD expenditures in Laos that have not been indicated above.

## TOP SECRET

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